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In late 1983 a series of police sweeps 
was instituted as part of a general crack­
down on street crime in China. To 
facilitate such police action, key sec­
tions of the C onstitution were 
suspended. Emergency measures were 
invoked, increasing dramatically the 
type of sentences which could be meted 
out for those crimes targetted in this 
campaign. In addition, the procedures 
for dealing with these elements were 
‘speeded up’. Summonses were no 
longer necessary and details of the char­
ges were no longer forwarded to the 
defendant’s counsel. The right of appeal 
was severely limited. Arbitrary arrest 
and, in some cases, execution of 
criminal gangs and so-called ‘hoodlum 
elements’ followed. Reportedly, quotas 
were set for the arrest and execution of 
corrupt and criminal elements. It has 
been estimated that some 100,000 
people were arrested in these nation­
wide sweeps. Legally defined rights 
were denied to the accused criminal and 
the convicted criminal in this campaign.
All this was fine as far as the general 
public was concerned, so long as the
erosion of rights was confined to mar­
ginal, criminal and generally un­
desirable elements in society. The 
problem is, however, that the erosion of 
rights which was actively supported by 
the general public when instituted 
against hoodlums in 1983 and against 
prisoners generally has now been 
turned against significant sections of 
the population at large.
Perhaps the best way of understanding 
the structural mechanisms which impel 
continued incursions of human and 
legal rights stems from the dissident 
party theoretician Su Shaozhi.
For Su, neo-authoritarianism arises 
from feudal remnants. Feudal remnants 
are a continually reproducing feature of 
contemporary Chinese society. Nor are 
corruption and official malevolence, as 
some party bureaucrats would have it, a 
result of the reforms or of the ‘open 
door’ and western decadence. While, 
arguably, western influence has its 
decadent effects, the primary cause lies 
in the continuing fusion of political and 
economic structures.
The fusion of state, party and 
economy creates a situation where all 
goals become subservient to the politi­
cal. In a situation where the party main­
tains ‘iron’ laws of discipline, normal 
and non-threatening dissent becomes il­
legitimate. In fact, neo-authoritarianism 
becomes a continuing temptation. This 
becomes especially prevalent when the 
party is unable to lay down ground rules 
for freedom of expression. Part of this 
difficulty  arises from ‘orthodox 
marxism’ subsuming politics to con­
siderations of class. Many questions 
arise which are not amenable to a class 
reductionist framework. Political prac­
tice should recognise these and allow a 
degree of political pluralism where in­
terest groups can express their con­
cerns.
Su Shaozhi and other dissidents such 
as Wang Ruoshui have little advice as 
to how legitimate criticism can be dis­
tinguished from illegitimate. This, we 
might add, is not a simple problem and 
it does not only affect ‘socialist’ 
regimes. The boundaries of legitimate 
dissent are equally as obscure in
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Some on the left seem beholden 
to two myths connected with the 
Beijing massacre in June.
The first is that the students’ sole 
genuine demand was the elimination 
of corruption and, therefore, that the 
call for democracy was merely a 
genuflection to their naive view of the 
west.
Indeed, the argument goes, the fact 
that the students sang The Internation­
ale, praised Gorbachev and did not 
call for the overthrow of the Chinese 
Communist Party showed they were 
not interested in widening Chinese 
democracy or human rights.
Wrong. While students, like workers 
and intellectuals, strongly opposed 
corrupt practices, such as the opera­
tion of foreign bank accounts by 
senior leaders, they also perceived the 
direct link between democracy and 
corruption.
The rigid, hierarchical structure of 
Chinese society encourages almost 
feudal-like networks of patronage, all 
leading towards the centre. The 
Chinese party-state  has been 
described by one writer as "a stratified 
system of corruption". Critically, 
there is no democratic check on 
bureaucrats, senior party leaders or the 
party itself.
Our own parallel, albeit on a milder 
scale, is Queensland, where Commis­
sioner Tony Fitzgerald QC has em­
phasised the link between the state’s 
undemocratic electoral system and the 
entrenched networks of corruption.
The other, less believable, line ped­
dled by some socialists is that some­
how foreign capital was involved in 
the massacre, or that it would be a 
beneficiary. In this way, some seem to 
think, foreign business is implicated in 
the massacre and the crackdown.
Despite the iniquities, waste and un­
trammelled economic power usually 
associated with multinationals, the 
above argument misses the point, or 
several points.
Foreign businesses - not to mention 
foreign embassies - were fired upon by 
troops in the weeks following the mas­
sacre. Even the China International 
Trade and Investment Corp (CITIC) 
building, the skyscraper citadel of 
modem Chinese business and head of­
fice to many western companies, was 
strafed with gunfire. Over this and 
other similar incidents, no apologies 
have been issued.
Meanwhile, not only have many 
foreign businesses withdrawn, but the 
goodwill which led many of them to 
China in the first place has evaporated.
Holding the reins of power now in 
China are those such as Chen Yun, 
xenophobic old men who despise vir­
tually all of the economic and social 
advances of 1987-89, including any 
involvement with foreign capital. As 
we now see, they are doing their best 
to turn the clock back.
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